Chilcot Report: Executive Summary

'A further and devastating indictment not only of Tony Blair personally but of a whole apparatus of state and government, Cabinet, Parliament, armed forces, and, far from least, intelligence agencies.— GEOFFREY WHEATCROFT, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS'It offers a long and painful account of an episode that may come to be seen as marking the moment when the UK fell off its global perch, trust in government collapsed and the country turned inward and began to disintegrate.'— PHILIPPE SANDS, LONDON REVIEW OF BOOKSDescriptionAll the key findings of the public inquiry into the handling of the 2003 Iraq war by Tony Blair's government in a 60,000-word book.Chaired by Sir John Chilcot, the Iraq Inquiry (known as the 'Chilcot Report') tackled:• Saddam Hussein's threat to Britain• the legal advice for the invasion• intelligence about weapons of mass destruction and• planning for a post-conflict Iraq.The behaviour of the GCHQ whistleblower Katharine Gun and the controversy over whether Iraq had weapons of mass destruction was the subject of the film Official Secrets.Table of ContentsIntroductionPre-conflict strategy and planningThe UK decision to support US military action. UK policy before 9/11The impact of 9/11Decision to take the UN routeNegotiation of resolution 1441The prospect of military actionThe gap between the Permanent Members of the Security Council widensThe end of the UN routeWhy Iraq? Why now? Was Iraq a serious or imminent threat?The predicted increase in the threat to the UK as a result of military action in IraqThe UK’s relationship with the USDecision-making. Collective responsibilityAdvice on the legal basis for military action. The timing of Lord Goldsmith’s advice on the interpretation of resolution 1441Goldsmith’s advice of 7 March 2003Goldsmith’s arrival at a “better view”The exchange of letters on 14 and 15 March 2003Goldsmith’s Written Answer of 17 March 2003Weapons of mass destruction. Iraq WMD assessments, pre-July 2002Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003The search for WMDPlanning for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq. The failure to plan or prepare for known risksThe planning process and decision-makingOccupation. Looting in BasraLooting in BaghdadUK influence on post-invasion strategy: resolution 1483UK influence on the Coalition Provisional AuthorityA decline in securityThe turning pointTransition. UK influence on US strategy post-CPAPlanning for withdrawalThe impact of AfghanistanIraqiisationPreparation for withdrawal. A major divergence in strategyA possible civil warForce Level ReviewThe beginning of the endDid the UK achieve its objectives in Iraq?• Key Findings 1. Development of UK strategy and options, 9/11 to early January 2002Development of UK strategy and options, January to April 2002 – “axis of evil” to CrawfordDevelopment of UK strategy and options, April to July 2002Development of UK strategy and options, late July to 14 Sep 2002• Key Findings 2. Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January 2003Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March 2003Iraq WMD assessments, pre-July 2002Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003WMD search• Key Findings 3. Advice on the legal basis for military action, November 2002 to March 2003Development of the military options for an invasion of IraqMilitary planning for the invasion, January to March 2003Military equipment (pre-conflict)Planning for a post-Saddam Hussein IraqInvasion• Key Findings 4. The post-conflict periodReconstructionDe-Ba’athificationSecurity Sector ReformResourcesMilitary equipment (post-conflict)Civilian personnelService PersonnelCivilian casualtiesLessons. The decision to go to warWeapons of mass destructionThe invasion of IraqThe post-conflict periodReconstructionDe-Ba’athificationSecurity Sector ReformResourcesMilitary equipment (post-conflict)Civilian personnelTimeline of events Read more